

```

record CwF {i}{j}{k}{l} : Set (lsuc (i ∪ j ∪ k ∪ l)) where
  field
    Con      : Set i
    Sub      : Con → Con → Set j
    _◦_      : ∀{Γ Δ} → Sub Δ Γ → ∀{Θ} → Sub Θ Δ → Sub Θ Γ
    ass      : ∀{Γ Δ}{γ : Sub Δ Γ}{Θ}{δ : Sub Θ Δ}{Ξ}{θ : Sub Ξ Θ} → ((γ ◦ δ)
    id       : ∀{Γ} → Sub Γ Γ
    idl      : ∀{Γ Δ}{γ : Sub Δ Γ} → γ ∘ id ~ γ
    idr      : ∀{Γ Δ}{γ : Sub Δ Γ} → γ ∘ id ~ γ
    ◇        : Con
    ε        : ∀{Γ} → Sub Γ ◇
    ◇η       : ∀{Γ}{σ : Sub Γ ◇} → σ ~ (ε {Γ})
    Ty       : Con → Set k
    _[-_]T   : ∀{Γ} → Ty Γ → Sub Γ Γ → Ty Γ
    [-_]T    : ∀{Γ}{A : Ty Γ}{γ : Sub Δ Γ}{Θ}{δ : Sub Θ Δ} → A [ γ ◦ δ ]T
    [id]T    : ∀{Γ}{A : Ty Γ} → A [ id ]T ~ A
    Tm       : (Γ : Con) → Ty Γ → Set l
    _[-_]t   : ∀{Γ}{A : Ty Γ} → Tm Γ A → ∀{Δ}(γ : Sub Δ Γ) → Tm Δ (A [ γ ]T)
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    _,-[_]-  : ∀{Γ Δ}(γ : Sub Δ Γ) → ∀ {A A'} → A [ γ ]T ~ A' → Tm Δ A' → SU
    p        : ∀{Γ A} → Sub (Γ ▷ A) Γ
    q        : ∀{Γ A} → Tm (Γ ▷ A) (A [ p ]T)
    ▷β1    : ∀{Γ Δ}{γ : Sub Δ Γ}{A}{a : Tm Δ (A [ γ ]T)} → p ◦ (γ , [ ~refl

```

Strictifying Categories with Families

Today's menu

Formalising normalisation proofs for dependent type theory

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Formalising normalisation proofs for dependent type theory
~ with a side of gluing ~

I.

Introduction

Why bother proving normalisation?

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- ▶ Mathematical constructions are programs!

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It incorporates **computation** within the logical foundations

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- ▶ Mathematical constructions are programs!

→ The problem of type-checking is now intrinsically linked with computation.

Why bother proving normalisation?

Normalisation property:

Every well-typed terms reduce to a **normal form**, and the $\beta\eta$ -equality of terms corresponds to the syntactical equality of normal forms.

Road to normalisation

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- ▶ First, we define a calculus of **untyped terms**:

$$\Lambda := x \mid tu \mid \lambda x.t \mid \dots$$

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which are inductively generated by **typing rules**:

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \vdash t : B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x.t : \Pi(x : A).B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t \equiv u : A}{\Gamma \vdash u \equiv t : A} \quad \dots$$

Proving normalisation

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- ▶ If we want to prove a metatheoretical property of well-typed terms, our only option is induction on typing derivations
- ▶ For complex properties, a naive induction will not go through: we must strengthen the induction hypothesis
- ▶ The standard tool for this is **logical relations**

Logical relations in two seconds

- ▶ A **reducible** integer is a normalising term of type \mathbb{N}

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- ▶ A reducible term of type $\cup \dots$

The devil is in the details

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- ▶ We must account for weakening
 - Reducibility PERs should really be **presheaves** of PERs

Taming the devil with boilerplate

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- ▶ Barras, Werner, "Coq in Coq" (1997)
- ▶ Barras, "Intuitionistic Set Theory and Type Theories with Inductive Families" (2012)
- ▶ Wieczorek, Biernacki, "A Coq Formalization of Normalization by Evaluation for Martin-Löf Type Theory" (2018)
- ▶ Abel, Öhman, Vezzosi, "Decidability of conversion for type theory in type theory" (2018)
- ▶ Adjedj, Lennon-Bertrand, Maillard, Pédro, P., "Martin-Löf à la coq" (2023)

II.

Gluing? Quésaco?

The algebraist's approach

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Instead of reasoning on syntax, we shift our focus to a well-behaved category of models. For dependent type theory, a common option is **Categories with Families** (CwF)

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A category with families is the data of:

- ▶ A category of contexts and substitutions
- ▶ For every context Γ , a set of types $\text{Ty } \Gamma$
- ▶ For every subst. $\sigma : \Delta \rightarrow \Gamma$, a function $\text{Ty } \Gamma \rightarrow \text{Ty } \Delta$
- ▶ For every context Γ and type A , a set of terms $\text{Tm } \Gamma A$
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- ▶ Context extensions $\Gamma \triangleright A$, context projections $\text{wk} : \Gamma \triangleright A \rightarrow \Gamma$ and $\text{var}_0 : \text{Tm } (\Gamma \triangleright A) (A[\text{wk}])$

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- ▶ and more...

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General theorems ensure the existence of an **initial** CwF
This initial model is the "syntax"

(intrinsically well-typed terms quotiented by conversion.)

Moving the goalposts

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
Assuming the equality of normal forms is **decidable** and the proof is constructive, this is enough to obtain decidability of typechecking.

The algebraist revisits reducibility

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
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


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π is the first projection

Initiality ensures that π has a **section**, which associates a proof of reducibility to any object of O_{CwF} .

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But instead of using PERs on raw syntax, we use **proof-relevant predicates** on well-typed syntax quotiented by conversion.

The resulting proof is arguably more principled and cleaner...at least on paper!

III.

Gluing in a proof assistant

Extensionality in type theory

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```

However, we really wanted to extract an algorithm from our proof!

Extensionality in type theory

No reason to panic: in 2025, this is not an insurmountable problem anymore. We have several options:

- ▶ Cubical type theory (Coquand, Cohen, Huber, Mörtberg '16)
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Furthermore, OTT is available in Coq/Rocq (P., Leray, Tabareau) and can be implemented in Agda using rewriting rules.

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ass : ∀{Γ Δ}{γ : Sub Δ Γ}{Θ}{δ : Sub Θ Δ}{Ξ}{θ : Sub Ξ Θ} → ((γ ∘ δ) ∘ θ) ~ (γ ∘ (δ ∘ θ))
id : ∀{Γ} → Sub Γ Γ
idl : ∀{Γ Δ}{γ : Sub Δ Γ} → (id ∘ γ) ~ γ
idr : ∀{Γ Δ}{γ : Sub Δ Γ} → (γ ∘ id) ~ γ
∘ : Con
ε : ∀{Γ} → Sub Γ ∘
∘η : ∀{Γ}{σ : Sub Γ ∘} → σ ~ (ε {Γ})

Ty : Con → Set k
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p : ∀{Γ A} → Sub (Γ ▷ A) Γ
q : ∀{Γ A} → Tm (Γ ▷ A) (A [ p ]T)
▷β₁ : ∀{Γ Δ}{γ : Sub Δ Γ}{A}{a : Tm Δ (A [ γ ]T)} → p ∘ (γ , [ ~refl ] a) ~ γ
▷β₂ : ∀{Γ Δ}{γ : Sub Δ Γ}{A}{a : Tm Δ (A [ γ ]T)} → q [ γ , [ ~refl ] a ]t ~ a
▷η : ∀{Γ Δ A}{γa : Sub Δ (Γ ▷ A)} → ((p ∘ γa) , [ [∘]T ] (q [ γa ]t)) ~ γa
```

Gluing in a proof assistant

Then, we want to define indexed CwFs over the initial CwF
→ another, even more complex, list of fields

Gluing in a proof assistant

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→ another, even more complex, list of fields

Finally, we want to define the glued model as an indexed CwF
→ welcome to **transport hell!**

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In traditional proofs, terms are a first order object and substitutions are defined by recursion on terms.

Most substitution laws become **definitional** equalities

$$(\prod A B)[\sigma] \equiv \prod (A[\sigma]) (B[\sigma \uparrow])$$

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Most substitution laws become **definitional** equalities

$$(\prod A B)[\sigma] \equiv \prod (A[\sigma]) (B[\sigma \uparrow])$$

But in our QIIT formulation, substitutions are part of the algebra signature, and we only get **propositional** equalities

$$(\prod A B)[\sigma] = \prod (A[\sigma]) (B[\sigma \uparrow])$$

Gluing in a proof assistant

In conclusion, normalisation by gluing is even less tractable than old fashioned normalisation proofs.



IV.

Strictification

From propositional to definitional

Point of today's talk:

give an alternative definition of the initial CwF, for which almost all of the administrative equations become definitional equalities.

Strictifying groups

Suppose G is a group:

$$\begin{array}{ll} G & : \text{Set} \\ _ \times _ & : G \rightarrow G \rightarrow G \\ \text{inv} & : G \rightarrow G \\ e & : G \\ \text{assoc} & : \forall x y z, (x \times y) \times z = x \times (y \times z) \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{unit}_l & : \forall x, e \times x = x \\ \text{unit}_r & : \forall x, x \times e = x \\ \text{inv}_l & : \forall x, (\text{inv } x) \times x = e \\ \text{inv}_r & : \forall x, x \times (\text{inv } x) = e \end{array}$$

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Then G embeds in the group of **permutations** of G (Cayley's theorem)

$$\text{Perm}(G) := \{ f : G \rightarrow G \mid \text{isBijjective } f \}$$

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$$\text{Perm}(G) := \{ f : G \rightarrow G \mid \text{isBijjective } f \}$$

Essential point: the group law on $\text{Perm}(G)$ is given by function composition, which is **definitionally** associative and unital!

Strictifying groups

If we have access to a sort of **proof-irrelevant propositions**, we can define a group that is isomorphic to G :

$$G' := \{ f : G \rightarrow G \mid \exists (g : G), f = \tau_g \}$$

With G' being definitionally associative and unital:

$$((f, f_\varepsilon) \circ (g, g_\varepsilon)) \circ (h, h_\varepsilon) \equiv (f, f_\varepsilon) \circ ((g, g_\varepsilon) \circ (h, h_\varepsilon))$$

$$(f, f_\varepsilon) \circ (id, id_\varepsilon) \equiv (f, f_\varepsilon)$$

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Strictifying CwFs, first attempt

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any category C embeds into the category $\hat{C} := \text{Hom}(C^{op}, \text{Set})$.

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The Yoneda generalises to categories with families:

Given a CwF C , the presheaf category \hat{C} is naturally equipped with a CwF structure inherited from Set . Additionally, there is an embedding of CwFs $C \rightarrow \hat{C}$.

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We can thus try the same trick: define C' to be the image of C under the embedding.

Strictifying CwFs, first attempt

C' is thus isomorphic to C , and enjoys more definitional eqs:

- ▶ substitutions are definitionally associative
- ▶ substitutions are definitionally unital
- ▶ wk and var_0 satisfy their equations definitionally

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C' is thus isomorphic to C , and enjoys more definitional eqs:

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- ▶ wk and var_0 satisfy their equations definitionally

...BUT

The commutation of substitutions with binders is not definitional

$$(\Pi A B)[\sigma] \not\equiv \Pi (A[\sigma]) (B[\sigma \uparrow])$$

Strict presheaves

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$$F_y (a |_f) \not\approx (F_x a) |_f$$

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$$F_y (a |_f) \not\cong (F_x a) |_f$$

In "Russian constructivism in a prefascist theory" (2020), Pédrot introduces **prefascist sets**, an alternative definition of presheaves that is strictly natural.

Strictifying CwFs, second attempt

If we reproduce our strictification construction using Pédrot's definition, we obtain a new CwF C'' , in which all* the administrative equalities are definitional.

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Strictifying CwFs, second attempt

If we reproduce our strictification construction using Pédrot's definition, we obtain a new CwF C'' , in which all* the administrative equalities are definitional.

We formalised the construction of C'' and its isomorphism with C in Agda. Surprisingly doable, even when the CwF is equipped with dependent products and booleans!

Back to our original goal

Applying our strictification construction to the initial CwF, it becomes much easier to construct gluing models. We were able to define a canonicity model (which computes normal forms for closed terms) in about 200 lines!

(the strictification construction is about 4000 lines)

Thank you!